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- _____________________________________________________
- The Computer Incident Advisory Capability
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- Information Bulletin
-
- Dir II Virus on MS DOS Computers
-
- October 17, 1991, 15:30 PDT Number C-2
-
- Critical Dir II Virus Facts
- _________________________________________________________________________
- Name: Dir II virus
- Aliases: Dir-2, MG series II, Creeping Death, DRIVER-1024, Cluster
-
- Virus Type: Directory infector with stealth characteristics
-
- Variants: Unsubstantiated reports exist for two variants
-
- Platform: MS-DOS computers
-
- Damage: May destroy all .EXE and .COM files and backup diskettes,
- crash some lookalike systems, CHKDSK /F destroys all
- executible files
-
- Symptoms: CHKDSK reports many cross-linked files and lost file chains
- can corrupt backups, copied files are only 1024 bytes long,
- more (see below)
-
- First Discovered: May 1991 in Bulgaria
-
- Eradication: Perform a series of simple DOS commands (see below)
- _________________________________________________________________________
-
- The Dir II virus presents a new type of MS-DOS virus called a
- directory infector. This virus modifies entries in the directory
- structure, causing the computer to jump to the virus code before
- execution of a program begins. Also, this virus utilizes stealth
- techniques to hide its existence in memory.
-
- How Infection Occurs
-
- Initial hard disk infection occurs when a file with an infected
- directory is executed. The virus establishes itself in memory and
- puts a copy of itself on the last cluster of the disk. Once the virus
- is active in memory, executing any file (infected or not) will cause
- the virus to infect the directory entry of ALL .EXE and .COM files in
- the current directory and in the directories listed in the PATH
- variable. Additional detailed information on the infection technique
- is included in the appendix at the end of this bulletin.
-
- Potential Damage
-
- If there is currently information residing on the last cluster of the
- disk, this virus will overwrite it upon installation. Since most
- backup utilities fill diskettes to capacity, backups are prone to
- immediate corruption upon initial infection.
-
- The most damaging characteristic of this virus occurs if a user boots
- from a clean diskette and attempts to run a disk optimizer program
- such as CHKDSK /F, Norton Disk Doctor, or other similar utility
- programs. When such a program attempts to "fix" the disk, all
- infected executibles will "become" the virus, effectively destroying
- the original file!
-
- Detection
-
- Although current versions of many common anti-viral utilities will not
- detect this virus and are unable to remove it, manual detection can be
- performed using the following methods:
-
- 1. Boot from the suspect infected hard disk. With the suspected virus
- active in memory, execute the command CHKDSK with NO arguments.
- Then reboot from a clean, write protected diskette (such as the
- original DOS diskette), and execute the command CHKDSK with no
- arguments again. If many cross-linked files and lost file chains
- are reported during the second CHKDSK and not the first, it is an
- indication of infection.
-
- 2. Boot from the suspected infected hard disk. With the suspected
- virus active in memory, use the COPY command to copy suspect files
- with the extension .EXE or .COM. Examine the file length of these
- copied files by using the DIR command, then reboot from a clean,
- write protected diskette and perform the same copy command(s). If
- the file length of the second copy is very small (around 1K) but
- the file length of the first copy is much larger, you may be
- infected with the Dir II virus.
-
- Eradication
-
- To manually eradicate this virus, follow these steps for every
- infected disk and diskette:
-
- 1. While Dir II is active in memory, use the COPY command to copy all
- .EXE and .COM files to a file with a different extension.
- Example: COPY filename.com filename.vom
-
- 2. Reboot system from a clean, write protected diskette to ensure the
- system does not have the virus in memory.
-
- 3. Delete all files with extensions of .EXE and .COM. This will
- remove all pointers to the virus.
-
- 4. Rename all executibles to their original names.
- Example: RENAME filename.vom filename.com
-
- 5. Examine all these executibles you have just restored. If any are
- 1K in length, they probably are a copy of the virus. Destroy any
- executibles of this size.
-
- For additional information or assistance, please contact CIAC:
-
- Karyn Pichnarczyk
- (510) 422-1779 **or (FTS) 532-1779
-
- Send e-mail to ciac@llnl.gov or call CIAC at
- (510) 422-8193**/(FTS)532-8193.
-
- **Note area code has changed from 415, although the 415 area code will
- work until Jan. 1992.
-
- CIAC would like to thank Bill Kenny of DDI for his help with this
- bulletin. Neither the United States Government nor the University of
- California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, expressed
- or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the
- accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, product, or
- process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe
- privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial
- products, process, or service by trade name, trademark manufacturer,
- or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its
- endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States
- Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of
- authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of
- the United States Government nor the University of California, and
- shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
-
-
- Appendix: Detailed DIR II Information
-
- The DOS directory structure contains the following entries: filename,
- extension, attribute, time, date, cluster, filesize, and an unused
- area; the cluster entry is the pointer to where the actual file exists
- on the disk. Dir II infects the directory structure by scrambling the
- original cluster entry and storing it in part of the unused area, then
- placing a pointer to the viral code in the cluster entry. Thus when a
- program is executed, the computer executes the viral code, the virus
- decrypts the original cluster entry, then the virus allows the
- original program to proceed.
-
- Upon initial infection, the virus links itself into the device driver
- chain, copying itself to the last cluster (or last two clusters, if
- cluster size is less than 1024 bytes) on the disk and infects the
- directory structure of all .EXE and .COM files residing in the current
- directory and all directories defined in the path. The virus infects
- all files with .EXE or .COM as an extension whether or not they are
- executible, EXCEPT if the size of the file is less than 2K, larger
- than 256K, or has an attribute of System, Volume, or Directory set.
- Therefore it does not infect the two hidden system files, but it DOES
- infect command.com.
-
- Following the supplied eradication steps will simply remove all "live"
- pointers to the viral code. After eradication you may wish to use a
- direct disk access utility (such as Norton Utilities) to directly
- access the viral code existing on the last cluster on the disk and
- overwrite it with blanks. Another recommended final clean-up may
- entail running a disk optimizer program that will clean out all
- unnecessary deleted files. It is important to remember that this
- virus has infected all .COM and .EXE files, even if they are tagged as
- deleted. Therefore if an undelete utility is used on these files, the
- virus can resurface.
-
- Other Facts About Dir II
-
- - Using CHKDSK to detect this virus from a clean boot will only work
- if there is more than one infected executible on a disk.
-
- - Dir II has an internal counter which determines a generation number
- of the virus.
-
- - Dir II does not infect partitions that are accessed through a
- loadable device driver.
-
- - Due to the stealth characteristics of Dir II, while the virus is
- memory-resident all file accesses, backups, deletes, copies, etc are
- accomplished with no discernable problems. Also, errors resulting
- from execution of Dir II (such as an attempt to infect a
- write-protected diskette) are suppressed by the virus.
-
- - The first execution of a file causes the virus to become memory
- resident. Before it is resident, if a file is copied from an
- infected disk to a hard disk all that will copy will be a 1K length
- file containing the virus. After eradication procedures this copied
- file will still be a copy of the virus. Such files can be a very
- good clue to track where the virus originated.
-
- - If the virus is not active in memory, interaction with infected
- files produces unusual results. Copying an infected file will copy
- a file only 1K long (the virus itself). Deleting a file will mark
- it as deleted, not but does not affect the virus.
-
- - With the virus active in memory, formatting a disk will produce the
- virus in the last cluster.
-
- - Because this virus uses a new type of attack scheme, versions prior
- to October, 1991 of most anti-viral utilities will not detect it,
- and cannot clean it. Since Dir II associates itself with the device
- drivers, programs which detect unauthorized requests to become
- memory resident do not detect this virus.
-
- - This virus is not compatible with all non IBM MS-DOS machine ROMS
- and will crash some hard disk systems immediately upon initial
- infection.
-
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